2021.07.14 國際新聞導讀-FDA說打第三劑無必要、土耳其真的想與以色列改善關係？以色列對迦薩重建的態度及對西岸法塔政權的海關稅返還扣除手段 FDA 表示，輝瑞冠狀病毒疫苗加強注射是不必要的 在 BioNTech SE 宣布計劃在變種和數據傳播的情況下，尋求美國和歐洲監管機構批准其第三劑 COVID-19注射劑之後，FDA 宣布了這一消息。 通過路透 2021 年 7 月 13 日 13:18 在這張 2020 年 10 月 31 日拍攝的插圖中，在顯示的輝瑞標誌前可以看到貼有“COVID-19/冠狀病毒疫苗/僅注射”標籤的小瓶和一個醫用注射器 （圖片來源：路透社/DADO RUVIC/插圖/文件照片） 廣告 該公司週日表示，COVID-19疫苗製造商輝瑞公司週一與聯邦衛生官員會面，討論在準備尋求授權時是否需要加強劑量的冠狀病毒疫苗。 會議召開前幾天，該製藥商及其合作夥伴 BioNTech SE 宣布計劃尋求美國和歐洲監管機構批准第三劑 COVID-19 注射劑，因為變種和數據的傳播表明他們表示初始接種六個月後感染風險增加. 這一推動促使美國食品藥品監督管理局和疾病控制與預防中心迅速做出反應，稱美國人現在不需要助推器。 輝瑞公司發言人表示，週一，輝瑞公司計劃與 FDA 的代表會面。華盛頓郵報首先報導了這次會議。 美國衛生與公共服務部的代表沒有立即回應置評請求。 喬·拜登總統的首席醫療顧問兼美國國家過敏症和傳染病研究所負責人安東尼·福奇，以及美國國立衛生研究院和疾病預防控制中心的負責人也被邀請參加簡報會，簡報會可能會移到另一天，根據郵報的報導。 福奇在周日的幾次電視採訪中表示，美國衛生官員並沒有否認未來可能需要加強劑——尤其是在接種疫苗的人中出現了突破性感染的情況下——但任何正式建議都需要更多的數據。 “現在有很多動態的事情正在發生，”他告訴美國廣播公司新聞的“本週”節目。 他在 CNN 的“State of of工會。” 儘管FDA 和 CDC 發表聲明，“這並不意味著我們不會非常非常積極地跟踪和收集所有這些信息，以查看我們是否以及何時可能需要它，如果需要以及何時需要，我們將擁有一切到位去做。” 美國衛生官員仍在努力讓某些地區的人們接受初步接種，因為具有高度傳染性的 Delta 變種已成為美國的主要毒株，而 COVID-19 病例主要在未接種疫苗的人群中上升。 歐洲官員還表示，疫苗目前似乎對變種具有保護作用。加拿大還表示正在監測變種和可能需要的助推器。 雖然一些科學家也質疑加強注射的必要性，但其他人表示，它們可能對老年人和其他弱勢群體有益，儘管尚不清楚何時需要。 一些公共衛生專家還表示擔心，在其他國家仍在努力應對初始接種的情況下，在富裕的發達國家授權加強疫苗將進一步加劇疫苗的不平等。 Pfizer coronavirus vaccine booster shot unnecessary, FDA says The FDA announcement came after BioNTech SE announced plans to seek US and European regulatory approval for a third dose of their COVID-19 shot amid the spread of variants and data. By REUTERS JULY 13, 2021 13:18 Vials with a sticker reading, "COVID-19 / Coronavirus vaccine / Injection only" and a medical syringe are seen in front of a displayed Pfizer logo in this illustration taken October 31, 2020 (photo credit: REUTERS/DADO RUVIC/ILLUSTRATION/FILE PHOTO) Advertisement COVID-19 vaccine maker Pfizer Inc met with federal health officials on Monday to discuss the need for a booster dose of the coronavirus vaccine as it prepares to seek authorization, the company said on Sunday. The meeting comes days after the drugmaker and its partner BioNTech SE announced plans to seek US and European regulatory approval for a third dose of their COVID-19 shot amid the spread of variants and data they said showed heightened risk of infection six months after initial inoculation. That push prompted a quick response from the US Food and Drug Administration and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, saying Americans do not need a booster right now. On Monday, Pfizer is scheduled to meet with representatives of the FDA, a company spokesperson said. The meeting was first reported by the Washington Post. Representatives for the US Department of Health and Human Services did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Anthony Fauci, President Joe Biden’s chief medical adviser who also directs the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, as well as the heads of the National Institutes of Health and the CDC were also among those invited to the briefing, which could move to another day, according to the Post's report. Fauci, in several television interviews on Sunday, said US health officials were not dismissing the possible future need for boosters -- especially as breakthrough infections among those who have been vaccinated have emerged -- but that more data is needed for any formal recommendation. "There's a lot of dynamic things going on right now," he told ABC News' "This Week" program. "There are studies being done now ongoing as we speak about looking at the feasibility about if and when we should be boosting people… there's a lot of work going on to examine this in real time," he added on CNN's "State of the Union." Despite the FDA and CDC's statement, "that doesn't mean that we're not very, very actively following and gathering all of this information to see if and when we might need it and if and when we do, we'll have everything in place to do it." US health officials are still struggling to get people in some areas to receive their initial inoculations as the highly contagious Delta variant has grown to be the nation's dominant strain, with COVID-19 cases rising mostly among the unvaccinated. European officials has also said vaccines currently seem protective against variants. Canada has also said it is monitoring variants and the possible need for boosters. While some scientists have also questioned the need for booster shots, others have said they could be beneficial for the elderly and other vulnerable populations, although it is unclear when they would be needed. Some public health experts have also expressed concern that authorizing boosters in wealthy developed nations while other countries are still struggling against initial inoculations will further exacerbate vaccine inequity. 越南將混合劑量的輝瑞和阿斯利康 COVID-19 疫苗 根據初步結果，西班牙的一項研究發現輝瑞和阿斯利康的組合非常安全和有效。 通過路透 2021 年 7 月 13 日 15:50 2021 年 2 月 7 日，在奧地利維也納成立為冠狀病毒病疫苗接種中心的維也納展覽中心會議中心，一名醫護人員將一劑輝瑞-BioNTech COVID-19 疫苗交給醫生。 （照片來源：路透社/LISI NIESNER/文件照片） 廣告 河內——越南政府週二表示，越南將提供輝瑞和 BioNTech 聯合開發的冠狀病毒疫苗作為首次接種阿斯利康疫苗的人的第二劑選擇。 越南的大規模接種運動尚處於初期階段，迄今只有不到 30 萬人接種了疫苗。到目前為止，它已經使用了阿斯利康的病毒載體疫苗，並於上週交付了 97,000 劑輝瑞-BioNTech mRNA 疫苗。 政府在一份聲明中說：“輝瑞疫苗將優先用於 8-12 週前第一次接種阿斯利康的人。” 包括加拿大、西班牙和韓國在內的幾個國家已經批准了這種劑量混合，主要是因為擔心與阿斯利康疫苗相關的罕見且可能致命的血栓。 根據初步結果，西班牙的一項研究發現輝瑞和阿斯利康的組合非常安全和有效。 但世界衛生組織的首席科學家週一建議不要混合和匹配 COVID-19 疫苗，稱其為“危險趨勢”，因為關於健康影響的數據很少。 隨著感染速度的增長，越南一直在努力加快其疫苗接種運動，本月已八次創下每日記錄。週二報告了 2,031 例新感染病例，其中大部分發生在震中胡志明市。 在 2021 年 5 月之前，它總共記錄了不到 3,000 例冠狀病毒病例。它的案件量現在是 34,500，其中 130 人死亡。 越南周二表示，它將很快收到澳大利亞捐贈的 150 萬劑阿斯利康疫苗，以及本週來自日本的另外一批 100 萬劑疫苗。 Vietnam to mix doses of Pfizer, AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccines A Spanish study found the Pfizer-AstraZeneca combination was highly safe and effective, according to preliminary results. By REUTERS JULY 13, 2021 15:50 A healthcare worker hands over doses of the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine to a doctor at Messe Wien Congress Center, which has been set up as coronavirus disease vaccination centre, in Vienna, Austria February 7, 2021. (photo credit: REUTERS/LISI NIESNER/FILE PHOTO) Advertisement HANOI - Vietnam will offer the coronavirus vaccine jointly developed by Pfizer and BioNTech as a second dose option for people first inoculated with the AstraZeneca vaccine, the government said on Tuesday. Vietnam's mass inoculation campaign is in its early stages, with less than 300,000 people fully vaccinated so far. It has so far used AstraZeneca's viral vector vaccine and last week took delivery of 97,000 doses of the Pfizer-BioNTech mRNA shot. "Pfizer vaccines will be prioritized for people who were given first shot of AstraZeneca 8-12 weeks before," the government said in a statement. Several countries, including Canada, Spain and South Korea, have already approved such dose-mixing mainly due to concerns about rare and potentially fatal blood clots linked to the AstraZeneca vaccine. A Spanish study found the Pfizer-AstraZeneca combination was highly safe and effective, according to preliminary results. But the World Health Organization's chief scientist advised on Monday against mixing and matching COVID-19 vaccines, calling it a "dangerous trend" since there was little data available about the health impact. Vietnam has been trying to expedite its vaccination campaign as the pace of infections grow, having hit daily records eight times this month. It reported 2,031 new infections on Tuesday, most of those in the epicenter Ho Chi Minh City. Prior to May 2021, it had recorded less than 3,000 coronavirus cases in total. Its caseload is now 34,500, with 130 deaths. Vietnam said on Tuesday it would soon receive 1.5 million doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine donated by Australia and an additional batch of one million doses of the vaccine from Japan this week. 以色列應該警惕土耳其的禮物 - 評論 埃爾多安是想升溫與以色列的關係還是向他們潑冷水？無論如何，誰會從評論如此矛盾的人那裡購買二手車？ 作者：HERB KEINON 2021 年 7 月 13 日 22:40 土耳其總統塔伊普·埃爾多安於 2021 年 3 月 4 日在土耳其安卡拉通過視頻鏈接參加了他執政的 AK 黨的會議。 （圖片來源：總統新聞辦公室/通過路透社的講義） 廣告 18年後你會認識一個人。 18 年是雷傑普·塔伊普·埃爾多安 (Recep Tayyip Erdogan ) 領導土耳其的時間：前 11 年擔任總理，後 7 年擔任總統。 在此期間，以土關係從黃金時代進入了黑暗時代。不是因為以色列在 2003 年埃爾多安上台後的行為方式與兩國戰略聯盟之前的行為完全不同，而是因為埃爾多安 - 以其根深蒂固的伊斯蘭世界觀 - 從根本上改變了土耳其對以色列的態度。 埃爾多安將以色列從盟友變成敵人、朋友變成敵人、在國際舞台上的伙伴變成方便的鞭打男孩，以在國內獲得政治點數和穆斯林世界的熱烈掌聲。 早在 2009 年，時任以色列大使加比·利維（Gabby Levy）在維基解密電報中被引述說埃爾多安是一個“原教旨主義者”，“在宗教上憎恨我們”。那是在 2010 年 Mavi Marmara 船隊事件之前，在 2014 年在加沙的保護邊緣行動之前，以及在 2018 年美國大使館搬到耶路撒冷之前。 週一晚上，同一個埃爾多安打電話給新總統艾薩克·赫爾佐格，並傳達了一個簡單的信息：讓我們重新開始。 可愛的情緒，儘管考慮到埃爾多安的過往記錄，但很難不質疑他的誠意。 5 月，在聖殿山發生騷亂之後，土耳其總統這樣評價以色列：“殘忍的恐怖主義國家以色列襲擊了耶路撒冷的穆斯林，他們唯一關心的是保護他們的家園和他們的神聖價值觀，以野蠻的方式沒有道德的方式。” 然而，週一，他的辦公室發表了他與赫爾佐格通話的聲明，稱土耳其總統“強調土以關係對中東的安全與穩定非常重要，而且存在巨大潛力。促進兩國在各個領域的合作，特別是能源、旅遊和技術。” 然而，就在第二天，他的辦公室發表了另一份不那麼和解的聲明，猛烈抨擊以色列拆毀房屋，並說“我們譴責以色列的非法和不人道做法，並在此重申我們支持司法程序，讓以色列對其在該國的罪行負責。被佔領土。” 那麼是哪一個？埃爾多安是想升溫與以色列的關係還是向他們潑冷水？無論如何，誰會從評論如此矛盾的人那裡購買二手車？就像一個男人追求一個女人，首先告訴一個朋友她很卑鄙，然後檢查她是否會和他約會，然後在他消除那些觸角後的第二天貶低她的外表。 是的，以色列很了解埃爾多安，18 年後它才知道是一個堅定的反以色列伊斯蘭主義者，他一直試圖煽動穆斯林世界反對這個猶太國家，並經常兜售反猶太主義言論來這樣做。 他是一位具有新奧斯曼幻想的領導人，他支持 2010 年馬維馬爾馬拉的挑釁，當時以色列突擊隊登上一艘被派往打破以色列對哈馬斯控制的加沙地帶的合法海上封鎖的船隻，並在遭到襲擊後殺死了船上的 9 人。 以色列知道埃爾多安的土耳其是如何接待哈馬斯辦公室的，在那裡計劃襲擊以色列人。它知道從土耳其出來的哈馬斯洗錢活動，以及為恐怖組織成員提供護照。 它知道土耳其為破壞以色列-塞浦路斯-希臘天然氣管道所做的努力；關於它在各種國際論壇上不斷試圖破壞以色列的方式；以及它對伊朗的偶爾支持（當它符合其利益時）。 而這些只是安卡拉對以色列採取的部分行動。它對該地區其他人採取的無數行動——從庫爾德人到埃及人，再到塞浦路斯人和希臘人——讓耶路撒冷感到厭惡。 但是，當埃爾多安打電話並輕聲細語時，自然會想說：“這太棒了——讓我們試一試，重新開始吧。” 然而，以色列不能對它在與誰打交道抱有任何幻想。 在宣讀埃爾多安辦公室與赫爾佐格的通話時，土耳其總統強調“為解決巴以爭端採取的積極步驟也將促進土耳其與以色列關係的積極發展。 ” 然而，以色列需要讓土耳其知道它有自己的期望和要求。 如果安卡拉希望建立更好的關係以緩解其地區孤立，幫助與白宮建立更好的關係，並從以色列在“能源、旅遊和技術”方面提供的東西中受益，那麼埃爾多安需要停止他尖銳的反以色列和反猶太主義修辭。 他需要停止指責以色列進行種族滅絕，停止將以色列與納粹進行比較，停止幫助和教唆哈馬斯，停止試圖入侵耶路撒冷，停止在經濟上支持那些在聖殿山上煽動的人，停止在北約阻撓以色列，停止試圖魚雷猶太國家與穆斯林世界其他國家的新興聯繫。例如，就在幾個月前，埃爾多安威脅要從阿聯酋召回他的大使，以抗議其與耶路撒冷建立關係。 顯然，以色列將受益於與土耳其改善關係和更好的關係，不僅因為貿易增加，而且因為它是敘利亞和更廣泛地區的重要參與者，如果不包括在帳篷內，可能會造成巨大的破壞。在它之外。 與此同時，任何為恢復兩國之間曾經存在的親密關係而採取的行動都不能以犧牲以色列在過渡期間與土耳其的地區敵人建立更牢固的關係為代價，其中有很多：來自羅馬尼亞和保加利亞在巴爾幹半島，到地中海東部的塞浦路斯和希臘，到阿拉伯國家中的埃及和阿拉伯聯合酋長國。 當埃爾多安在本世紀的第一個十年改變土耳其的外交政策路線時，以色列失去了一個重要的戰略夥伴。但與其舉起雙手大喊“gevalt！” 耶路撒冷通過與鄰國其他國家結盟，找到了彌補失去土耳其的方法。 這些聯盟現在不能僅僅因為埃爾多安今天認為與猶太國家建立更好的關係符合他的利益——他已經一次又一次地明確表示他實際上厭惡這種關係。 土耳其媒體將與赫爾佐格的電話大肆渲染，以期在耶路撒冷新領導層的到來之際重啟關係。 但這是關於以色列與土耳其關係的硬道理：只有當土耳其最終獲得新領導人時，關係才會真正重啟，而以色列則不會。即使那一天到來，重建信任也需要時間，因為埃爾多安已經成功——通過他對以色列的不斷妖魔化——讓他的許多同胞反對這個猶太國家。 Israel should be wary of Turkey's gifts - comment Does Erdogan want to warm up ties with Israel or throw ice-cold water on them? Regardless, who would buy a used car from someone whose comments were so contradictory? By HERB KEINON JULY 13, 2021 22:40 Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan attends a meeting of his ruling AK Party via video link in Ankara, Turkey March 4, 2021. (photo credit: PRESIDENTIAL PRESS OFFICE/HANDOUT VIA REUTERS) Advertisement You get to know a guy after 18 years. And 18 years is how long Recep Tayyip Erdogan has led Turkey: the first 11 as prime minister and the last seven as president. During that period, Israeli-Turkish ties went from the Golden Era to the Dark Ages. Not because Israel acted in a radically different way after Erdogan came to power in 2003 than it did beforehand when the two countries enjoyed a strategic alliance, but because Erdogan – with his deeply embedded Islamic worldview – fundamentally changed Turkey’s attitude toward Israel. Erdogan turned Israel from ally into adversary, friend to foe, partner on the international stage to convenient whipping boy in order to gain political points domestically and tumultuous applause in the Muslim world. Already in 2009, Israel’s ambassador at the time, Gabby Levy, was quoted in a Wikileaks cable as saying that Erdogan was a “fundamentalist” who “hates us religiously.” And that was before the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in 2010, before Operation Protective Edge in Gaza in 2014, and before the US embassy moved to Jerusalem in 2018. On Monday evening, that same Erdogan called new President Isaac Herzog with a simple message: Let’s start afresh. Lovely sentiment, though considering Erdogan’s track record, it’s rather difficult not to question his sincerity. In May, following riots on the Temple Mount, the Turkish president had this to say about Israel: “Israel, the cruel terrorist state, attacks the Muslims in Jerusalem, whose only concern is to protect their homes and their sacred values, in a savage manner devoid of ethics.” Yet, on Monday, his office put out a statement of his call with Herzog that said the Turkish president “underscored that Turkey-Israel relations were of great importance in terms of security and stability in the Middle East, and that there was a great potential for cooperation between the two countries in various areas, notably energy, tourism and technology.” The very next day, however, his office put out another statement, less conciliatory, slamming Israel for house demolitions and saying “we condemn Israel’s unlawful and inhumane practices and hereby reiterate our support for the judicial process to hold Israel accountable for its crimes in the occupied territories.” SO WHICH is it? Does Erdogan want to warm up ties with Israel or throw ice-cold water on them? Regardless, who would buy a used car from someone whose comments were so contradictory? It’s like a man courting a woman who first tells a friend that she is despicable, then checks to see if she might go out with him on a date, and then the day after he put out those feelers disparages her appearance. Yes, Israel knows Erdogan well, and what it has come to know after 18 long years is a staunchly anti-Israel Islamist who consistently tries to inflame the Muslim world against the Jewish state, often peddling in antisemitic rhetoric to do so. He is a leader with neo-Ottoman fantasies who supported the 2010 Mavi Marmara provocation where Israeli commandos boarded a ship sent to break Israel’s lawful naval blockade of the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip and, after coming under attack, killed nine people on that ship. Israel knows how Erdogan’s Turkey has hosted an office of Hamas, where attacks against Israelis have been planned. It knows about the money laundering for Hamas coming out of Turkey, as well as the provision of passports for members of the terror organization. It knows about Turkish efforts to scuttle an Israeli-Cypriot-Greek natural gas pipeline; about the way it constantly tries to undermine Israel in various international forums; and about its occasional support for Iran (when it suits its interests). And those are just some of the actions Ankara has taken against Israel. There are also the myriad actions it has taken against others in the region – from the Kurds to the Egyptians to the Cypriots and Greeks – that Jerusalem finds loathsome. But when Erdogan calls and whispers sweet nothings, there is a natural tendency to want to say, “That’s marvelous – let’s give it a whirl and start anew.” Yet Israel must harbor no illusions about who it is dealing with. In the readout of the call with Herzog that Erdogan’s office put out, the Turkish president was quoted as stressing that “the positive steps to be taken for the settlement of the Palestine-Israel dispute would also facilitate a positive course in Turkey-Israel relations.” ISRAEL NEEDS to let Turkey know, however, that it has expectations and demands of its own. If Ankara wants better ties to ease its regional isolation, help build better relations with the White House and benefit from what Israel has to offer in terms of “energy, tourism and technology,” then Erdogan needs to stop his strident anti-Israel and antisemitic rhetoric. He needs to stop accusing Israel of genocide, stop comparing Israel to Nazis, stop aiding and abetting Hamas, stop trying to make inroads in Jerusalem, stop financially backing those agitating on the Temple Mount, stop blocking Israel at NATO and stop trying to torpedo the Jewish state’s burgeoning ties with other countries in the Muslim world. Just a few months ago, for instance, Erdogan threatened to recall his ambassador from the UAE to protest its establishment of ties with Jerusalem. Israel, obviously, would benefit from an improved relationship and better ties with Turkey, not only because of increased trade but also because it is an important player in Syria and the wider region, which if not included inside the tent, can cause tremendous damage from outside of it. At the same time, any move towards reclaiming some of the closeness that once existed between the two countries must not be done at the expense of stronger relationships that Israel developed in the interim with Turkey’s regional foes, and there are many: from Romania and Bulgaria in the Balkans, to Cyprus and Greece in the eastern Mediterranean, to Egypt and the United Arab Emirates among the Arab states. Israel lost an important strategic partner when Erdogan altered the course of Turkey’s foreign policy in the first decade of this century. But rather than throwing up its hands and yelling “gevalt!” Jerusalem found ways to make up for what it lost in losing Turkey by allying with other countries in the neighborhood. Those alliances must now not be jeopardized just because Erdogan today deems it in his interest to have better relations with the Jewish state – which he has made clear time and time again that he actually loathes. The Turkish media played up the phone call with Herzog as an effort to restart ties with the advent of the new leadership in Jerusalem. But here is the hard truth about Israel-Turkey ties: A true reboot of the relationship will only come about when Turkey finally gets a new leader, not when Israel does. And even when that day comes, it will take time to rebuild the trust because Erdogan has succeeded – through his constant demonization of Israel – in turning many of his countrymen against the Jewish state. 拜登在也門的戰略：縮編和外交——分析 總統並沒有採取紅線政策和追究沙特阿拉伯的責任，而是一直試圖在不搖擺不定的情況下推進他的平台。 作者：勞倫摩根貝瑟 2021 年 7 月 13 日 17:13 2021 年 7 月 8 日，美國總統喬拜登在美國華盛頓白宮東廳發表講話，就政府在阿富汗的持續縮編努力發表講話時指指點點。 （照片來源：伊芙琳·霍克斯坦/路透社） 廣告 在美國總統喬·拜登2021 年 2 月 4 日的首次外交政策演講中，他戲劇性地宣布他將終止美國對也門戰爭中“進攻性行動”的支持。拜登的決定似乎標誌著他的兩位前任的一個轉折點，他們幫助支持沙特領導的聯盟在也門打擊胡塞武裝。 伊朗支持的胡塞叛軍與沙特領導的聯盟之間在也門發動的戰爭進入了第七個年頭。2014 年，在胡塞武裝控制首都薩那後，胡塞武裝與軟弱的也門政府之間開始了戰鬥。作為回應，沙特阿拉伯和其他八個得到美國、英國和法國支持的阿拉伯國家發起了一場以空襲為中心的運動。 2015 年，在伊朗核協議談判期間，前總統巴拉克奧巴馬為沙特阿拉伯的聯盟開綠燈，包括提供軍事支持，部分抵消了該國對該協議的強烈反對。特朗普政府繼續提供這種支持，作為專注於強大的美沙關係的更廣泛戰略的一部分。 然而，在上任之前，拜登發起了一場運動，重點是限制對沙特人的無條件支持，包括增加對侵犯人權行為的問責，並“讓 [ing] 他們實際上成為他們的賤民”。 自上任以來，拜登似乎已經從這個職位上退了一步。總統並沒有採取紅線政策和追究沙特阿拉伯的責任，而是一直試圖在不搖擺不定的情況下推進他的平台。他的戰略在於製定更廣泛的政策，在不失去包括沙特阿拉伯在內的該地區主要盟友的情況下，平衡他希望減少美國在中東的參與。 例如，華盛頓自 4 月以來一直在從海灣地區拆除愛國者反導彈電池，包括從沙特阿拉伯的蘇丹王子空軍基地拆除，這是美國削減該地區部隊的更廣泛戰略的一部分。 與此同時，為了抵消這種脫離接觸的一些影響，拜登一直在向沙特人發出信號，表明美國仍然重視與他們的伙伴關係。即使在今年早些時候發布將王儲穆罕默德·本·薩勒曼與沙特記者賈馬爾·卡舒吉謀殺案聯繫起來的報告之後，政府的反應仍然很平靜。 “我們已經從重新校準的角度討論過這個問題。這不是破裂，”美國國務院發言人內德·普萊斯在 3 月份關於殺戮事件的報告出來後談到美國與沙特的關係時說。 這種“重新調整”的一部分在於邀請沙特高級官員到華盛頓等舉措。上週，王儲的兄弟、國防部副部長哈立德·本·薩勒曼親王訪問了美國首都，談論也門和伊朗的威脅，但重要的是，儘管哈立德參與了掩蓋事件，但他並未討論卡舒吉謀殺案. 2018 年 10 月 25 日，一名示威者在土耳其伊斯坦布爾的沙特阿拉伯領事館外舉著一張帶有沙特記者賈馬爾·卡舒吉照片的海報。（圖片來源：REUTERS/OSMAN ORSAL） 也門的戰爭遵循類似的模式。拜登的政策在於依靠外交和軍事削減，以期最終退出衝突。 這一戰略的第一部分在於他在 2 月份宣布停止對進攻性行動的支持。這包括阻止向沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯聯合酋長國出售包括精確制導彈藥在內的武器，直接反對前總統唐納德特朗普在該國的政策，該政策的特點是支持沙特領導的聯盟。 支持這種行動的人表示，這是姍姍來遲，向沙特發出了一個重要信號。但批評者，包括國會中的進步民主黨人，表示尚不清楚“進攻性行動”是什麼。2月24日，約41名國會議員致信拜登，支持退出，並要求澄清措辭；政府的反應是沉默的。 這種對“進攻性行動”的限制並不一定意味著美國不再支持沙特領導的聯盟。例如，美國軍隊仍在幫助為沙特飛機提供服務，以保持戰機在空中，支持該王國戰略的一個關鍵要素。 該戰略的下一個分支在於加強外交。拜登本人說：“我們也在加強外交以結束也門戰爭——這場戰爭造成了人道主義和戰略災難。我已要求我的中東團隊確保我們支持聯合國牽頭的實施停火、開放人道主義渠道和恢復長期擱置的和平談判的倡議。 為支持這一目標，拜登任命蒂姆·蘭德金為美國駐也門特使，這是自戰爭開始以來第一個擔任該職位的特使。 Lenderking 上任以來的主要戰略在於專注於區域參與者，包括該地區的巡迴演出。近日，他於6月4日前往沙特、約旦、阿曼和阿聯酋會見高級官員和也門人，討論危機，並於6月18日返回沙特阿拉伯。 美國對胡塞武裝的態度也發生了變化。2 月，國務卿安東尼·布林肯 (Antony Blinken) 撤銷了胡塞武裝——其口號是“美國之死，以色列之死，詛咒猶太人，伊斯蘭的勝利”——被列為恐怖組織，從而扭轉了特朗普政府的決定。6 月 25 日，Lenderking 描述了這一舉動：“美國承認他們是合法行為者。沒有人可以希望他們離開或脫離衝突，所以讓我們處理實地存在的現實。” 對胡塞武裝的這種承認可能是為了增加與該組織的外交渠道，以試圖達成協議以結束衝突。但到目前為止，Lenderking 和胡塞武裝之間仍然沒有直接對話。 但拜登的策略奏效了嗎？到目前為止，不是真的。針對拜登的行動，胡塞武裝只是升級了他們的行動，包括加強對沙特阿拉伯的無人機和導彈襲擊，以及在也門境內擴張領土。外交手段並未取得成效，因為胡塞武裝既拒絕了沙特阿拉伯的停火提議，也拒絕了讓步的提議，例如放寬對荷台達港的限制和向某些目的地開放薩那機場，此外還拒絕了單獨的美國停火計劃. 胡塞武裝還加大了對北部石油資源豐富的馬里布省的攻勢，該省是國際公認政府的中心。馬里布是一個重要的戰略要地，因為它是也門國民軍在北部的最後一個據點，也是通往南部的門戶，被政府和南部過渡委員會分開，為胡塞武裝利用他們的分裂提供了機會。 作為回應，5 月 20 日，拜登政府對領導馬里布襲擊的兩名主要軍事官員實施制裁，希望阻止該組織繼續推進。然而，進攻並沒有被阻止。 華盛頓近東政策研究所魯賓家族研究員埃拉娜·德洛齊爾 (Elana DeLozier) 表示，“最近結束戰爭的國際政治意願似乎反而增強了胡塞對其談判立場的看法。” 拜登政策的批評者還強調，美國在其外交戰略中正在失去對胡塞武裝的影響力。許多人還指出，伊朗不希望胡塞武裝讓步，以便在潛在的核談判中保持影響力。 目前看來，也門的戰爭還沒有結束。隨著僵局的持續，衝突的輸家是也門人民，他們在世界上最大的人道主義災難之一中遭受廣泛的營養不良和疾病。拜登目前的戰略似乎並未結束衝突，這引發了一個問題：也門的戰爭會結束嗎？ Biden’s strategy in Yemen: Drawdowns and diplomacy - analysis Instead of a policy of redlines and holding Saudi Arabia accountable, the president has been trying to advance his platform without rocking the boat. By LAUREN MORGANBESSER JULY 13, 2021 17:13 US President Joe Biden points a finger as he delivers remarks on the administration's continued drawdown efforts in Afghanistan in a speech from the East Room at the White House in Washington US, July 8, 2021. (photo credit: EVELYN HOCKSTEIN/REUTERS) Advertisement In US President Joe Biden’s first foreign policy speech on February 4, 2021, he dramatically announced that he would be ending US support for “offensive operations” in the war in Yemen. Biden’s decision appeared to mark a turning point from his two predecessors, who helped support the Saudi-led coalition against Houthi forces in Yemen. The war in Yemen, waged between the Iranian-backed Houthi rebel forces and a Saudi-led coalition, is entering its seventh year. Fighting started in 2014 between the Houthis and the weak Yemeni government after the Houthis took control of the capital Sanaa. In response, Saudi Arabia and eight other Arab states backed by the US, UK and France started a campaign centered around airstrikes. In 2015, amid the negotiations over the Iran nuclear deal, former president Barack Obama gave a green light to Saudi Arabia’s coalition, including providing military support, partially to offset the kingdom’s strong opposition to the deal. The Trump administration continued such support as a part of a broader strategy focusing on strong US-Saudi ties. However, before coming to office, Biden ran on a campaign focused on limiting unconditional support to the Saudis, including increasing accountability for human rights abuses and “mak[ing] them in fact the pariah that they are.” Since coming to office, Biden appears to have taken a step back from this position. Instead of a policy of redlines and holding Saudi Arabia accountable, the president has been trying to advance his platform without rocking the boat. His strategy lies in a broader policy of balancing his desired reduction of US involvement in the Middle East without losing key allies in the region, including Saudi Arabia. For example, Washington has been removing Patriot antimissile batteries from the Gulf since April, including from Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, part of a broader strategy of US reduction of forces in the region. At the same time, to offset some of the fallout from such disengagement, Biden has been signaling to the Saudis that the US still values a partnership with them. Even after the report came out earlier this year linking Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the response from the administration was muted. “We’ve talked about this in terms of a recalibration. It’s not a rupture,” State Department spokesman Ned Price said of the US-Saudi relationship in March, after the report on the killing came out. Part of this “recalibration” lies in moves like inviting top Saudi officials to Washington. Last week, Deputy Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, brother of the crown prince, visited the US capital to talk about Yemen and threats from Iran but, significantly, did not discuss the Khashoggi murder even though Khalid was reportedly involved in the cover-up. THE WAR in Yemen follows a similar pattern. Biden’s policy lies in relying on diplomacy and military reductions, in hopes of an eventual withdrawal from the conflict. The first part of this strategy lies in his announcement in February of halting support to offensive operations. This included blocking arms sales, including precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in direct opposition to former president Donald Trump’s policy in the country, which was marked by support for the Saudi-led coalition. Those who supported such an action said it was long overdue and that it sent an important signal to the Saudis. But critics, including progressive democrats in Congress, say it is unclear what “offensive operations are.” On February 24, some 41 members of Congress sent a letter to Biden supporting the withdrawal and asking for clarification on the language; the administration’s response was muted. Such limits on “offensive operations” do not necessarily mean that the US no longer supports the Saudi-led coalition. For example, US forces still helping service Saudi aircraft to keep the warplanes in the air, backing a key element of the kingdom’s strategy. The next prong of the strategy lies in increased diplomacy. Biden himself said: “We’re also stepping up our diplomacy to end the war in Yemen – a war which has created a humanitarian and strategic catastrophe. I’ve asked my Middle East team to ensure our support for the United Nations-led initiative to impose a ceasefire, open humanitarian channels and restore long-dormant peace talks. In support of this goal, Biden appointed Tim Lenderking as the US special envoy to Yemen, the first one filling that position since the war started. Lenderking’s main strategy since assuming the post lies in focusing on regional players, including tours of the region. Recently, on June 4, he went to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman and the UAE to meet with senior officials and Yemenis to discuss the crisis, as well as returning to Saudi Arabia on June 18. AMERICA’S TONE toward the Houthis has also changed. In February, Secretary of State Antony Blinken revoked the Houthis – whose slogan is “death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, and victory for Islam” – from being classified as a terrorist organization, reversing the Trump administration’s decision. On June 25, Lenderking described the move: "The United States recognizes them as a legitimate actor. No one can wish them away or out of the conflict, so let's deal with realities that exist on the ground.” Such recognition of the Houthis is likely intended to increase diplomatic channels with the group in an attempt to reach an agreement to end the conflict. But there have still been no direct talks so far between Lenderking and the Houthis. But has Biden’s strategy worked? So far, not really. In response to Biden’s actions, the Houthis have only escalated their campaign, including intensified drone and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia, as well as territorial expansion inside of Yemen. Diplomatic approaches have not proved fruitful, as the Houthis have rejected both Saudi Arabia’s offer of a ceasefire as well as offers of concessions, such as easing restrictions on Hodeida Port and opening Sanaa airport to some destinations, in addition to rejecting a separate US ceasefire plan. The Houthis have also increased their offensive against the oil-rich Marib province in the North, which is the center of the internationally recognized government. Marib is an important strategic location, as it is the Yemen National Army’s last stronghold in the North and a gateway to the South, which is divided between the government and the Southern Transitional Council, providing an opportunity for the Houthis to capitalize on their disunity. In response, on May 20, the Biden administration imposed sanctions on two key military officials leading the Marib attack, hoping to deter the group from continuing their advance. However, the offensive was undeterred. According to Elana DeLozier, the Rubin Family Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “the recent uptick in international political will to end the war seems instead to have emboldened Houthi perceptions of their negotiating position.” Critics of Biden’s policy also emphasize that the US is losing leverage over the Houthis in their diplomatic strategy. Many also point out that Iran does not want the Houthis to back down, so that it can keep leverage in potential nuclear talks. For the time being, it appears that the war in Yemen is not coming to an end. As the stalemate drags on, the losers of the conflict are the Yemeni people, who suffer from widespread malnutrition and disease in one of the greatest humanitarian disasters in the world. Biden’s strategy for now does not appear to be ending the conflict, prompting the question: Will the war in Yemen ever end? 以色列希望向加沙提供外援的憑證系統 “卡塔爾用於加沙的錢不會作為裝滿美元的手提箱進入哈馬斯。” 通過LAHAV哈爾科夫，路透 2021 年 7 月 13 日 20:07 在路透社於 2021 年 5 月 23 日獲得的這張講義圖片中，可以在埃及和加沙地帶之間的拉法過境點看到一輛載有埃及萬歲基金發送的物資的援助車隊的卡車。 （圖片來源：埃及總統/通過路透社的講義） 廣告 以色列公共安全部長 Omer Bar Lev 週二表示，以色列正在考慮向加沙支付外援的憑證系統，以防止捐款被轉用於支持巴勒斯坦飛地的哈馬斯統治者及其軍火庫。 總理納夫塔利·貝內特（Naftali Bennett）設想了“一種機制，其中的內容實質上將是食品券或人道主義援助券，而不是可用於開髮用於對抗以色列國的武器的現金，”巴列夫告訴陸軍電台。 巴爾列夫不排除卡塔爾繼續捐款的可能性，並提出了歐盟援助的可能性。 “卡塔爾為加沙提供的資金不會作為裝滿美元的手提箱進入哈馬斯，哈馬斯本質上是哈馬斯自己及其官員的重要組成部分，”部長補充說，呼應了貝內特最近的聲明。 “如果機制是這樣，我毫不懷疑以色列會幫助改善加沙地帶的人道主義局勢，”他說。 在 5 月份的 11 天跨境戰鬥之後，人道主義機構將貧困的加沙地帶的最新重建費用定為 5 億美元。 在 2014 年保護邊緣行動之後，卡塔爾為加沙的建築和其他項目提供了價值超過 10 億美元的資金，其中一些是現金。這些付款得到以色列的監督和批准，多哈在今年 5 月底承諾再提供 5 億美元。 一位接近貝內特的消息人士表示，重建加沙的資金必須通過聯合國分配，而代金券系統是他們正在考慮的一個選擇。以色列還沒有決定是否會同意聯合國巴勒斯坦難民機構近東救濟工程處或其他與哈馬斯合作歷史較少的機構提供援助。 “我們正在尋找聯合國充當中間人，”消息人士說。“我們希望對正在發生的事情進行記錄和監督。這不會是完美的，但總比將無法追踪的賬單發送到加沙而不知道發生了什麼事要好。” 哈馬斯沒有立即發表評論。 無法立即聯繫到卡塔爾駐加沙援助特使穆罕默德·艾瑪迪 (Mohammed al-Emadi) 置評。 一名巴勒斯坦官員告訴路透社：“一切都還沒有定論。” 歐盟、美國等一些國家已將哈馬斯列為恐怖組織。 美國國務院發言人內德·普賴斯上週表示，美國“致力於為巴勒斯坦人民提供他們在最近的暴力事件之後需要的人道主義援助，但由於多年的管理不善、忽視和哈馬斯的虐待。 ，事實上的管理當局。” 當被問及美國是否會通過聯合國向加沙提供援助時，普萊斯回答說：“很清楚的是，美國的資金不會流向哈馬斯，我們將與合作夥伴合作，確保資金得到有效分配。” Israel wants voucher system for foreign aid to Gaza "The Qatari money for Gaza will not go in as suitcases full of dollars which end up with Hamas." By LAHAV HARKOV, REUTERS JULY 13, 2021 20:07 An aid convoy's trucks loaded with supplies send by Long Live Egypt Fund are seen at the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, in this handout picture obtained by Reuters on May 23, 2021. (photo credit: THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENCY/HANDOUT VIA REUTERS) Advertisement Israel is considering a voucher system for foreign aid to be disbursed to Gaza, as a safeguard against donations being diverted to bolster the Palestinian enclave's Hamas rulers and their arsenal, Public Security Minister Omer Bar Lev said on Tuesday. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett envisaged "a mechanism where what will go in, in essence, would be food vouchers, or vouchers for humanitarian aid, and not cash that can be taken and used for developing weaponry to be wielded against the State of Israel,” Bar Lev told Army Radio. Bar Lev did not rule out continued donations from Qatar, and raised a possibility of European Union assistance. "The Qatari money for Gaza will not go in as suitcases full of dollars which end up with Hamas, where Hamas in essence takes for itself and its officials a significant part of it," the minister added, echoing recent statements by Bennett. "Should the mechanism be like this, I have no doubt that Israel would help in the improvement of the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip," he said. Humanitarian agencies put the latest reconstruction costs for the impoverished Gaza Strip at $500 million following 11 days of cross-border fighting in May. Qatar bankrolled more than $1 billion worth of construction and other projects in Gaza, some of it in cash, after Operation Protective Edge in 2014. The payments were monitored and approved by Israel, and Doha pledged another $500 million in late May of this year. A source close to Bennett said the funds to rebuild Gaza must be distributed via the UN and a voucher system is one option that they are considering. Israel also has yet to decide whether it would agree to UNRWA, the UN agency for Palestinian refugees, to delivery the aid, or another agency that has less of a history of working with Hamas. “We are looking for the UN to be the middle man,” the source said. “We want documentation and supervision of what’s happening. It won’t be perfect, but it’s better than sending untraceable bills into Gaza and not knowing what’s going on.” Hamas did not immediately comment. Mohammed al-Emadi, the Qatari aid envoy to Gaza, could not immediately be reached for comment. A Palestinian official told Reuters: "Nothing is final yet." The EU, United States and some other countries have designated Hamas as a terrorist organization. US State Department spokesperson Ned Price said last week that the US is "committed to providing the Palestinian people with the humanitarian assistance that they need both in the aftermath of the most recent violence, but from years of mismanagement, of neglect, of abuse by Hamas, the de facto governing authority." Asked if the US will send aid to Gaza via the UN, Price responded: "What is what is very clear is that US funds will not be going to Hamas, and we will work with partners to see that it’s distributed effectively." 以色列國防軍、辛貝特、甘茨不願因恐怖主義津貼而扣押巴勒斯坦權力機構稅——報告 瓦拉表示，儘管最終決定通過了，但安全官員警告說，現在不是對巴勒斯坦權力機構造成經濟打擊的好時機。 由TOI 工作人員提供今天，晚上 8:58 國防部長本尼·甘茨出席在以色列南部埃什科爾地區舉行的會議。2021 年 7 月 13 日。（Flash90） 國防部長本尼甘茨、交通部長梅拉夫米凱利和衛生部長尼贊霍洛維茨都對安全內閣決定從巴勒斯坦權力機構扣留數億謝克爾以抵消其支付給恐怖分子及其家人的資金持保留態度，瓦拉新聞網站週二報導。 報導稱，部長們的立場與軍方和辛貝特的立場一致。 安全內閣最終決定在周日從巴勒斯坦權力機構扣押近 6 億新謝克爾（1.83 億美元），用於支付過去一年支付的資金。 據報導，由於巴勒斯坦權力機構已經面臨金融衝突，三位部長對此舉的時機感到擔憂。 該網站援引兩名熟悉內閣會議事件的未具名高級官員的話說，軍方與巴勒斯坦人的主要聯絡人、領土政府活動協調員 (COGAT) 少將加桑·阿利安 (Ghassan Alian) 警告不要預扣稅款，並向部長們表示，2019 年的類似抵消尚未完成。 Alian 解釋說，PA 需要現金，同時承擔 2019 年和 2020 年的稅收對管理局來說將是沉重的打擊，儘管不是淘汰賽。據 Walla 報導，Shin Bet 的代表支持 Alian 的立場和他的擔憂，建議將行動推遲到以後的某個日期。 藍白黨的甘茨支持 COGAT 負責人的立場，並表示支持延期。工黨的米凱利和梅雷茨的霍洛維茨也支持推遲，指出削弱巴勒斯坦權力機構不利於以色列的利益。 2021 年 7 月 12 日，梅雷茨黨衛生部長尼贊·霍洛維茨（Nitzan Horowitz）左翼在耶路撒冷議會主持梅雷茨派別會議。（Olivier Fitoussi/Flash90） 隨後在會議期間，以色列國防軍代表介紹了有關由哈馬斯恐怖組織統治的加沙地帶的政策。 廣告 有人提出了削弱致力於摧毀以色列的哈馬斯的方法的建議，以支持與以色列有合作協議的巴勒斯坦權力機構。邁克爾和霍洛維茨隨後指出，建議的政策與預扣稅的計劃相矛盾，這會削弱巴勒斯坦權力機構。 據報導，關於預扣巴勒斯坦權力機構稅的討論只持續了幾分鐘，並沒有激烈進行，儘管這是自上個月新政府成立以來，聯盟夥伴首次在對巴勒斯坦人的政策上出現分歧。 在政治動盪中，以色列一直處於過渡政府之下，直到 6 月，新聯盟得到確認。 2021 年 7 月 12 日，工黨領袖交通部長梅拉夫·米凱利 (Merav Michaeli) 出席在耶路撒冷議會舉行的派系會議。 (Olivier Fitoussi/Flash90) 根據甘茨週日向安全內閣提交的一份報告，該報告由國防部國家反恐融資局準備，巴勒斯坦權力機構轉移了 5.97 億新謝克爾（1.82 億美元）作為“2020 年對恐怖主義的間接支持”。 總理辦公室在一份聲明中說：“根據這份報告，這些資金將從以色列向巴勒斯坦權力機構轉移的每月付款中凍結。” 這不是安全內閣第一次扣留其為巴勒斯坦權力機構收取的一些稅收資金，以懲罰它支付給被監禁的恐怖分子和襲擊者遇難者家屬的款項。 廣告 11 月，內閣投票決定從所謂的“支付殺戮”款項中扣除約 24 億新謝克爾（7.31 億美元）的約 6 億新謝克爾（1.83 億美元）。 巴勒斯坦官員表示，過去一年，他們正在考慮改革支付薪水的巴勒斯坦人被以色列安全犯罪和恐怖主義定罪的爭議PA政策。 囚犯問題長期以來一直阻礙巴勒斯坦權力機構在華盛頓的外交努力，以色列多次援引恐怖資金在國際論壇上批評拉馬拉。 今年 1 月上任的美國總統喬·拜登 (Joe Biden) 的政府一再敦促巴勒斯坦權力機構停止其“為因恐怖主義行為入獄的個人提供賠償”的政策。 但就在一個月前，據報導，巴勒斯坦權力機構主席馬哈茂德·阿巴斯批准向穆罕納德·哈拉比 (Muhannad Halabi) 的家人支付超過 40,000 美元的款項，後者在 2015 年耶路撒冷的一次持刀襲擊中殺死了兩名以色列人，然後被安全部隊擊斃。 IDF, Shin Bet, Gantz balked at seizing PA taxes over terror stipends — report Even though decision eventually passed, security officials warned that now is a bad time to deal a financial blow to PA, according to Walla By TOI STAFFToday, 8:58 pm Defense Minister Benny Gantz attends a conference in the Eshkol region, southern Israel. on July 13, 2021. (Flash90) Defense Minister Benny Gantz, Transportation Minister Merav Michaeli, and Health Minister Nitzan Horowitz all had reservations about a security cabinet decision to withhold hundreds of millions of shekels from the Palestinian Authority to offset funds that it paid to terrorists and their families, the Walla news website reported Tuesday. The report said the ministers’ positions were in line with those of the military and the Shin Bet. The Security Cabinet eventually decided on Sunday to seize nearly NIS 600 million ($183 million) from the PA over funds it paid out over the past year. The three ministers were reportedly concerned about the timing of the move due to the financial strife the Palestinian Authority is already facing. The website cited two unnamed senior officials familiar with events at the cabinet meeting, who said that the military’s chief liaison to the Palestinians, Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) Major-General Ghassan Alian, cautioned against withholding the taxes, reporting to ministers that a similar offset from 2019 had not yet been completed. The PA needs the cash and taking both the 2019 and 2020 taxes would be a heavy, though not knockout, blow for the Authority, Alian explained. Shin Bet representatives backed up Alian’s position and his concerns, proposing that the action be put off until a later date, Walla reported. The Blue and White party’s Gantz backed the COGAT chief’s position and also expressed support for a postponement. Michaeli, of the Labor party, and Horowitz, of Meretz also supported a delay, pointing out that weakening the PA is against Israel’s interests. Head of the Meretz party Health Minister Nitzan Horowitz, left leads a Meretz faction meeting at the Knesset, in Jerusalem, on July 12, 2021. (Olivier Fitoussi/Flash90) Later during the meeting, Israel Defense Forces representatives presented policy regarding the Gaza Strip, which is ruled by the Hamas terror group. ADVERTISEMENT A suggestion was made for methods to weaken Hamas, which is committed to Israel’s destruction, in favor of the PA, with which Israel has cooperation agreements. Michael and Horowitz then pointed out that the suggested policy was in contradiction to the plan to withhold the taxes, which would weaken the PA. According to the report, the discussion on withholding PA taxes lasted only several minutes and was not heated, though it represented the first time that coalition partners have disagreed on policy towards the Palestinians since the new government was formed last month. Amid political turmoil, Israel was under a transitional government until June, when the new coalition was confirmed. Labor party leader Transportation Minister Merav Michaeli attends a faction meeting at the Knesset, in Jerusalem, on July 12, 2021. (Olivier Fitoussi/Flash90) According to a report presented Sunday to the security cabinet by Gantz, prepared by the Defense Ministry’s National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing, the Palestinian Authority transferred NIS 597 million ($182 million) in “indirect support for terror in 2020.” “In light of this report, these funds will be frozen from the monthly payments that Israel transfers to the PA,” the Prime Minister’s Office said in a statement. It is not the first time the security cabinet has withheld some tax funds that it collects for the Palestinian Authority to penalize it for payments to imprisoned terrorists and the families of dead attackers. In November, the cabinet voted to hold back approximately NIS 600 million ($183 million) out of a transfer of around NIS 2.4 billion ($731 million) over the so-called “pay to slay” payments. Palestinian officials have indicated over the past year that they are considering reforming the controversial PA policy of paying salaries to Palestinians convicted by Israel of security offenses and terrorism. The prisoner issue has long hampered the PA’s diplomatic efforts in Washington, and Israel has repeatedly invoked the terror funding to criticize Ramallah in international forums. The administration of United States President Joe Biden, who took office in January, has repeatedly urged the PA to halt its policy of “providing compensation for individuals in prison for acts of terrorism.” But just a month ago, PA President Mahmoud Abbas reportedly approved a payment of more than $40,000 to the family of Muhannad Halabi, who killed two Israelis in a 2015 stabbing attack in Jerusalem and was then shot dead by security forces. 在加沙邊界平靜的情況下，以色列擴大了漁區和進出口 此舉是在國際壓力要求增加對加沙地帶的援助之際，在以色列和埃及外交部長會晤之後進行的；卡塔爾特使周日晚上抵達加沙 通過猶大阿里毛 2021 年 7 月 12 日，上午 10:35 2021 年 5 月 23 日，在哈馬斯和以色列在加沙城進行了為期 11 天的戰爭後，在允許有限數量的船隻返回大海後，漁民在將他們的貨物運送到市場之前裝載一輛馬拉車。 （美聯社照片/約翰·明奇洛） 以色列週一宣布了一系列針對加沙地帶的救濟措施，擴大了沿海飛地的捕魚區，並在邊境沿線相對平靜的情況下批准了額外的進出口。 此舉是在國際上越來越多的人呼籲為這個陷入困境的飛地提供更多人道主義援助之際，以色列與哈馬斯和巴勒斯坦伊斯蘭聖戰恐怖組織在 5 月份發生了大規模衝突，對加沙地帶的部分地區造成了大規模破壞。 在為期 11 天的戰鬥之後，以色列宣布將針對加沙制定一項新政策，在兩名以色列平民和兩名以色列國防軍陣亡士兵的遺體從哈馬斯返回之前，大幅限制可以進入該飛地的援助類型。囚禁。只允許食品、醫療用品、燃料、動物飼料和“關鍵行業的原材料”進入該領土。 一名聯合國官員告訴以色列時報，其他項目，例如重建被以色列國防軍轟炸摧毀的溫室的框架，仍被禁止進入，並感嘆耶路撒冷“對人道主義援助的定義非常狹隘”。 據巴勒斯坦媒體報導，卡塔爾特使 Mohammad al-Emadi 也於週日晚上抵達沿海飛地。卡塔爾資金繼續流入加沙——2021 年承諾提供約 3.6 億美元——是正在進行的談判的癥結所在。 這位聯合國官員表示，加沙地帶的總體出口也下降了 90%，並指出只允許少量農產品和紡織品離開加沙，但這些商品被禁止進入以色列——這是以色列的主要收入來源。飛地的出口經濟。 然而，最近幾週，通往埃及的 Rafah 和 Salah a-Din 過境點仍然對貨物和行人開放，但具體程度尚不清楚。 週一，被稱為“領土政府活動協調員”的以色列與巴勒斯坦人的軍事聯絡機構宣布將在一定程度上放寬這些措施。 廣告 2021 年 5 月 21 日，在埃及促成以色列和巴勒斯坦之間的停火協議後，一輛滿載人道主義援助的卡車通過 Kerem Shalom 過境點進入加沙地帶南部的拉法，該過境點是從以色列進入加沙的貨物的主要通道哈馬斯恐怖組織（SAID KHATIB / AFP） 從周一開始，允許加沙漁民航行的區域從 9 海裡擴大到 12 海裡。 額外的醫療設備、漁具以及當地工業和紡織品生產的原材料被允許通過與以色列的凱雷姆沙洛姆過境點進入加沙，科加特說。 此外，更多的紡織品和農產品可以通過過境點出口。 “政治梯隊批准的這些民事措施取決於持續的安全穩定，”COGAT 說。 在 5 月衝突後的幾週內，加沙地帶的恐怖分子開始向以色列領土發射攜帶燃燒裝置的氣球，引發了數十起火災，並燒毀了大片農田和自然保護區。 作為回應，以色列國防軍對加沙的哈馬斯基礎設施進行了空襲，以色列向恐怖組織發出信息，表示不會容忍此類襲擊。 隨著更多停火條款開始生效，這些縱火襲擊事件有所減少，過去一周半沒有發生跨境事件。 廣告 擴大捕魚區和進出口的決定是在外交部長亞伊爾·拉皮德與埃及外長薩梅赫·舒克里在布魯塞爾會晤後做出的。 據以色列外交部稱，兩人專注於恢復加沙地帶的努力。 自 2007 年哈馬斯控制該飛地以來，以色列和埃及就對加沙地帶實施了封鎖。兩國都表示，這項措施對於防止恐怖組織獲取武器和材料來建造防禦工事和隧道是必要的。5 月衝突中使用的大部分彈藥都是劣質的國產武器。 Amid calm on Gaza border, Israel expands fishing zone, imports and exports Move comes amid international pressure to increase assistance to the Strip, follows meeting between Israeli, Egyptian foreign ministers; Qatari envoy reaches Gaza on Sunday night By JUDAH ARI GROSS 12 July 2021, 10:35 am Fisherman load a horse-drawn cart before delivering their haul to market after a limited number of boats were allowed to return to the sea following a ceasefire reached after an 11-day war between Hamas and Israel, in Gaza City, May 23, 2021. (AP Photo/John Minchillo) Israel on Monday announced a series of relief measures for the Gaza Strip, expanding the coastal enclave’s fishing zone and approving additional imports and exports as relative calm persisted along the border. The move came amid growing international calls for additional humanitarian assistance for the beleaguered enclave, which saw a large-scale conflict between Israel and the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror groups in May that caused massive destruction to parts of the Strip. Following the 11-day battle, Israel announced it was instituting a new policy vis-à-vis Gaza, significantly limiting what types of aid could enter the enclave until two Israeli civilians and the remains of two fallen Israel Defense Forces soldiers are returned from Hamas captivity. Only food, medical supplies, fuel, animal fodder and “raw materials for critical industries” have been allowed into the territory. Other items, such as frames to rebuild greenhouses destroyed by IDF bombings, are still being barred from entering, a UN official told The Times of Israel, lamenting that Jerusalem had a “very narrow definition of what constitutes humanitarian assistance.” Qatari envoy Mohammad al-Emadi also arrived in the coastal enclave on Sunday night, Palestinian media reported. The continued channeling of Qatari money into Gaza — some $360 million was pledged for 2021 — is a sticking point in the ongoing negotiations. Overall exports from the Gaza Strip were also down 90 percent, the UN official said, noting that only small amounts of agricultural exports and textiles are being allowed out of Gaza but that those goods are barred from entering Israel — a main source of income for the enclave’s export economy. However, the Rafah and Salah a-Din crossings to Egypt have remained open for goods and pedestrians in recent weeks, though the extent of this was not immediately clear. On Monday, Israel’s military liaison body to the Palestinians, known as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, announced that it was easing those measures somewhat. ADVERTISEMENT A truck loaded with humanitarian aid, passes into Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, through the Kerem Shalom crossing, the main passage point for goods entering Gaza from Israel, on May 21, 2021, after a ceasefire brokered by Egypt between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas terror group (SAID KHATIB / AFP) Beginning Monday, the area in which Gaza fishermen are permitted to sail was expanded from nine nautical miles to 12. Additional medical equipment, fishing gear, and raw materials for local industries and textile production were allowed into Gaza through the Kerem Shalom Crossing with Israel, COGAT said. In addition, more textiles and agricultural products could be exported through the crossing. “These civilian measures that were approved by the political echelon are contingent upon continued security stability,” COGAT said. In the weeks following May’s conflict, terrorists in the Strip began launching balloons carrying incendiary devices into Israeli territory, sparking dozens of fires and burning large swaths of agricultural land and nature reserves. In response, the IDF conducted airstrikes on Hamas infrastructure in Gaza and Israel sent messages to the terror group that such attacks would not be tolerated. As more terms of the ceasefire began going into effect, these arson attacks abated, and the past week and a half has seen no cross-border incidents. The decision to expand the fishing zone and imports and exports came after a meeting between Foreign Minister Yair Lapid with his Egyptian counterpart Sameh Shoukry in Brussels. According to Israel’s Foreign Ministry, the two focused on the efforts to rehabilitate the Gaza Strip. Israel and Egypt have imposed a blockade on the Gaza Strip since 2007, when Hamas took control of the enclave. Both countries say the measure is necessary to prevent the terror group from obtaining weapons and materials to build fortifications and tunnels. Most of the munitions used in May’s conflict were inferior, domestically produced arms. 真主黨播放了 2006 年引發第二次黎巴嫩戰爭的襲擊的新鏡頭 恐怖組織發布了以前看不見的視頻，其中有特工穿過樹木繁茂的邊境地區並對以色列國防軍巡邏車進行致命轟炸，然後劫持了 2 名人質 由TOI 工作人員提供今天，上午 8:56 真主黨附屬 al-Manar 於 2021 年 7 月 12 日播出的視頻顯示，2006 年 7 月 12 日對以色列國防軍吉普車的襲擊引發了第二次黎巴嫩戰爭。（截屏） 在第二次黎巴嫩戰爭開始 15 週年之際，真主黨週一發布了此前未公開的 2006 年對以色列士兵的邊境襲擊引發武裝衝突的鏡頭。 與真主黨有關的 al-Manar 媒體播放的鏡頭顯示，恐怖組織成員在襲擊以色列巡邏部隊使用的吉普車之前穿過邊境附近的一片樹林。 真主黨特工隨後前往車輛，包圍它，拖出 Ehud Goldwasser 和 Eldad Regev，然後帶著人質逃回邊境，將他們的屍體裝上車輛。 其他三名士兵在襲擊中喪生，此後不久在以色列的一次失敗的救援行動中，又有五名以色列國防軍士兵被殺。 Goldwasser 和 Regev 被以色列當局假定在最初的襲擊中被殺，但他們的屍體直到 2008 年才被歸還。週一發布的鏡頭是第一次顯示以色列人被捕的情況。 這段視頻於週一發布，當時伊朗支持的恐怖組織真主黨試圖在黎巴嫩不斷升級的經濟危機中維護自己的地位。 廣告 真主黨過去曾播放過襲擊事件的鏡頭，包括在 2018 年，恐怖組織發布的鏡頭似乎顯示了襲擊發生後的瞬間 2016 年，隸屬於什葉派恐怖組織的電視頻道 al-Mayadeen 播出了一部紀念戰爭 10 週年的三集紀錄片系列。它包括真主黨戰士為襲擊進行訓練的鏡頭。 數以萬計的以色列人參加了 2006 年在特拉維夫為士兵 Ehud Goldwasser 和 Eldad Regev 舉行的集會。(Flash90) 真主黨還在 2007 年和 2012 年發布了視頻，包括襲擊的鏡頭和當天以色列國防軍通訊的音頻。 2012 年發布的視頻包括真主黨戰士向以色列國防軍悍馬開火併越過邊界進入以色列領土的突襲部分。當真主黨突擊隊到達被毀壞的車輛時，剪輯結束了。 這場為期 34 天的戰爭見證了數以千計的真主黨火箭襲擊北部城鎮，奪去了 165 名以色列人的生命，其中包括 44 名平民。包括真主黨戰士和平民在內的 1,100 多名黎巴嫩人被殺。 Hezbollah airs new footage from 2006 attack that triggered Second Lebanon War Terror group releases previously unseen video of operatives moving through wooded border area and carrying out deadly bombing of IDF patrol vehicle, then taking 2 hostages By TOI STAFFToday, 8:56 am Footage aired by Hezbollah-affiliated al-Manar on July 12, 2021, shows the attack on an IDF jeep on July 12, 2006 that sparked the Second Lebanon War. (Screen grab) On the 15th anniversary of the start of the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah on Monday released previously unseen footage from the 2006 border attack on Israeli soldiers that sparked the armed conflict. The footage broadcast by the al-Manar outlet associated with Hezbollah shows the terror group members moving through a wooded area near the border before the attack on a jeep used by patrolling Israeli troops. The Hezbollah operatives then head to the vehicle, surround it, and drag out Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, then flee with the hostages back across the border and load their bodies onto a vehicle. Three other soldiers were killed in the attack and five more IDF troops were killed shortly thereafter in a failed Israeli rescue attempt. Goldwasser and Regev were assumed by Israeli authorities to have been killed in the initial attack, but their bodies were not returned until 2008. The footage released Monday was the first time the capture of the Israelis was shown. The clip was released on Monday as Hezbollah, an Iran-backed terror group, attempts to assert itself amid Lebanon’s spiraling economic crisis. Hezbollah has broadcast footage from the attack in the past, including in 2018 when the terror group released footage that appeared to show the moments after the assault In 2016, al-Mayadeen, a television channel affiliated with the Shiite terror organization, aired a three-episode documentary series commemorating the war’s 10-year anniversary. It included footage of Hezbollah fighters training for the attack. Tens of thousands of Israelis attend a 2006 rally in Tel Aviv for soldiers Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev. (Flash90) Hezbollah also released videos in 2007 and 2012, including footage from the attack and audio from the IDF’s communications that day. The video released in 2012 included the part of the raid in which Hezbollah fighters opened fire on the IDF Humvee and crossed the border into Israeli territory. The clip ended just as the Hezbollah commandos reach the ruined vehicle. The 34-day war, which saw thousands of Hezbollah rockets pummel northern towns, claimed the lives of 165 Israelis, including 44 civilians. Over 1,100 Lebanese, including both Hezbollah fighters and civilians, were killed.